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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
States does determine the constitutional question involved in the present
case and the prior case of Weiss v. Leaon," the problems flowing from
racial restrictive covenants will continue to remain, in part, unsolved.
TORTS-RIGHT OF WIFE'S ADMINISTRATOR TO RECOVER
FROM HUSBAND'S ESTATE UNDER WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE
After shooting his wife, a husband then shot and killed himself. The
wife died a few minutes after her husband and was survived by a minor
daughter by a previous marriage. A suit was brought against the executor
of the husband's estate by the administrator of the wife's estate. The trial
court gave judgment for the defendant notwithstanding the verdict of the
jury for the plaintiff. Judgment was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District' but was reversed by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Welch v. Davis, 410 I11. 130, ioi N.E. 2d 547 (I951).
The Appellate Court had based its decision denying recovery on its
construction of the Married Women's Act2 and the Wrongful Death
Statute3 and held that the Married Women's Act did not give a wife the
right to sue her husband for a personal tort. Therefore, since the wife
could not maintain an action against her husband during her lifetime, her
administrator could not maintain an action for her wrongful death.
The Supreme Court's reversal was based on an interpretation of the
Wrongful Death Statute only. The court reasoned that the statute meant
to create a new cause of action in the next of kin, that the disability of the
wife to sue was personal, that the marriage had been terminated and that,
therefore, there was no reason to extend the inability to the beneficiaries
under the act.
At common law a person was not liable in tort for causing the death of
another.4 A cause of action for personal injuries did not survive the in-
jured party, and there was no action to recover damages caused by the
death of someone else. Recognizing the injustice of the situation, and the
beneficial interests that one party may have in the life of another, legis-
latures passed what are commonly referred to as Wrongful Death Statutes.
Generally, these statutes give a cause of action to the next of kin of the
deceased if the deceased would have been able to maintain a suit, had
death not ensued.
Such defenses as contributory negligence and self defense, which miti-
11 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. Ad (949).
' Welch v. Davis, 342 Il. App. 69, 95 N.E. 2d io8 (95o).
2 111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 68, SS 1-21.
3111. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 70, S§ S , 2.
4 25 C.J.S., Death 5 13 (194t); 16 Am. Jur., Death S 44 (1938).
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gate the wrongfulness of the defendant's act, are generally held to bar
recovery by the next of kin.5 But when the defendant asserts some status
or relationship, such as the husband and wife immunity asserted in the
Welch case which would have prevented the deceased from recovering,
the decisions are divided as to whether or not that status or relationship
will prevent recovery by the next of kin. Some courts feel that the statutes
do not intend to make the liability of the defendant greater than it was to
the deceased.6
Other courts follow the view expressed by the Illinois Supreme Court,
holding that the statute gives a new cause of action to the next of kin,
which, though it must be based on a wrongful act, should not be lost be-
cause of some personal disability of the deceased which would have barred
his recovery had he lived.7
It seems probable that the decision in the instant case will have an
important bearing on analogous situations. Two such situations arose in
cases cited by the Supreme Court as supporting authority.
In Cowgill v. Boock,8 suit was brought against the defendant for caus-
ing the death of defendantes minor son. The court allowed recovery, stat-
ing that the deceased could have recovered against his father because of
the father's serious and wilful misconduct. Thus, the case is not strictly in
point, but another case can be cited where the next of kin were allowed to
recover even though the dead child could not have himself sued his
parent.9
The Minnesota court, in Albrecbt v. Potthoff,'° held that even though
the wife of the defendant was the sole beneficiary of the action brought
by the executor of the deceased, the common law rule that a wife cannot
sue her husband did not apply..
Should any of these or other closely analogous situations arise in Illinois,
it would seem probable and reasonable that the next of kin could recover.
Under the common law a wife could not bring any action against her
husband."' So-called Married Women's Acts have been passed by the
legislatures allowing a wife to sue as though feme sole.
1 5 C.JS, Death 5§ 43, 44, 46 (941); 16 Am. Ju, Death $ 129 (1938).
6 Graham v. Miller, 182 Tenn. 434, 187 S.W. 2d 622 (1945); Cronin v. Cronin, 24
Wis. 372, 12 N.W. 2d 677 (944); Aldrich v.-Tracy, a22 Iowa 84, 269 N.W. 30 (1936);
Keister's Adm'r v. Keister's Exrs, 123 Va. 157, 96 SE. 315 (1918).
7 Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P. 2d 21 (1944); Breed v. Atlanta B. and C.R.
Co, z4i Ala. 640, 4 So. ad 315 (1941); Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 N.E. 2d
766 (194o).
8 189 Ore. 282, 218 P. ad 445 (1950).
9 Oliveria v. Oiveria, 305 Mass. 297, 25 NE. ad 766 (194o).
10 192 Minn. 557, 257 N.W. 377 (1934).
" 41 C.J.S., Husband and Wife S 396(a) (1944); 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife
S599 (194o).
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Nearly all jurisdictions have held, in construing these statutes, that
married women have been given the right to sue their husbands in prop-
erty cases,'12 but only a few states have allowed wives to recover from
their husbands for personal torts.'8
No cases can be found in Illinois, except the Appellate Court decision in
the Welch case, which decides whether or not the present Illinois Married
Women's Act allows a wife to recover from her husband for personal tort
injuries. A more recent Illinois Appellate Court case seems to take it for
granted that a wife cannot sue her husband. 14
Some vague inferences may be drawn from the language of the Supreme
Court in the Welch case indicating that the justice writing the decision
would favor allowing wives to sue their husbands for personal torts. How-
ever, it must be remembered that any reference to the Illinois Married
Women's Act in this case is dicta and even these vague implications are
not necessarily the opinion of the majority of the court.
It is, therefore, doubtful that the Welch case will be of any help to an
attorney advocating that a wife, under the present Illinois Married
Women's Act, has the right to sue her husband for personal injuries.
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF DRUNKOMETER TESTS
Defendant was convicted of driving an automobile while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor. On appeal, it was held that the admission
into evidence of the results of a drunkometer test was not error even
though such tests have not received general scientific recognition. People
v. Bobczyk, 343 Ill. App. 504, 9 9 N.E. 2d 569 (1951).
In most communities, the only basis for a diagnosis of intoxication is the
testimony of police officers and witnesses to an accident or traffic viola-
tion. Because the accuracy of such observations can be seriously chal-
lenged, certain scientific tests employing blood, breath or urine were
developed.
The breath test makes use of a device known as the Harger Drunko-
meter. The person whose breath is to be tested voluntarily inflates a
balloon. The breath thereby captured is released into a tube containing
certain chemicals which change color as they absorb the alcohol from the
air. The weights of the chemical before and after the test are compared,
and by simple mathematical computation, the amount of alcohol in the
1241 C.J.S., Husband and Wife S 396(b) (3) (1944); 27 Am. Jur., Husband and
Wife SS 599, 6oo (194o).
1841 C.J.S., Husband and Wife § 396(b)(2) (1944); 27 Am. Jur., Husband and
Wife §§ 591, 592, 593 (1940).
14 Tallios v. Tallios, 103 N.E. 2d 507 (IMI., 1952). This case held that a wife may
sue her husband's employer for a tort committed by the husband while acting as an
agent of the defendant.
